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Abstract. Recently, the notion of complete characterizations of secu-
rity protocols was introduced by Guttman and Thayer. We provide an
alternative denition of this concept, and extend an existing protocol
verication tool (Scyther) to compute our notion of complete character-
ization. We present both notions of complete characterization, discuss
their relative merits, and provide preliminary empirical results using an
extended version of the Scyther tool.
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1 Introduction
Many tools exist to verify whether or not a given security protocol satises a
specic property, e.g. [1{3]. In general, recent developments in security protocol
analysis tools have focussed on improving performance, in order to improve the
coverage of the analysis [4], or to allow for verication of larger protocols [3].
A protocol designer using such tools, upon nding an attack, needs to locate
the fault in the protocol that caused the attack, and repair it. The repaired
protocol is then again veried by the tool, until no more attacks are found.
Hence it is crucial to be able to understand how the protocol works (or why it
doesn't) from the output of such a tool. However, in general these tools share
some major drawbacks with other counterexample generating analysis methods:
the counterexample is often not minimal, and it is usually not clear how to nd
the fault that causes it. Furthermore, if the particular counterexample is in some
sense not harmful, or will not occur in practical applications, the tools do not
provide a means to show all possible counterexamples/attacks (because this set
is usually in the order of the size of the state space, e.g. exponential or innite).
An alternative approach for analysing and verifying protocols was started
in [5{7]. In this approach, the idea is not to verify a specic property, but to give
a concise nite representation of all possible behaviours of a security protocol,
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in such a way that certain classes of security properties can be trivially veried.
Such a nite representation is called the complete characterization of a security
protocol. A tool called CPSA1 (Cryptographic Protocol Shape Analyzer) was
developed to compute the complete characterizations. The approach is described
in e.g. [5] and uses and extended version of the Strand Space method [8], in
which the nite representations are expressed in terms of shapes using the so-
called skeletons-and-homomorphisms approach. We describe these concepts in
Section 2, and provide a brief introductory example below.
Example 1 (Needham-Schroeder (Skeletons, CPSA)). Consider the two-party ver-
sion of the Needham-Schroeder protocol. From the point of view of a responder
Bob, upon the completion of the protocol, the following must have happened:
there must be an honest agent that has performed the initiator role of the pro-
tocol, and received Bob's nonce. However, this agent may or may not have been
communicating with Bob (representing either normal behaviour or the man-in-
the-middle attack). This message ow is represented below in Figure 1. Hence,
if we focus on honest agent behaviour only, the complete characterization of the
responder role is captured by a single message ow.
Fig.1. Needham-Schroeder Shape for B (privk(A) uncompromised, Nb fresh)
This single message ow captures the following execution traces: (1) assume
the private key of the initiator's intended partner is known to the intruder (in
case privk(C) is known to the intruder), and (2) assume this private key is not
known to the intruder, and infer that the intended partner must be Bob (in case
C = B).
In this paper we show how to achieve an alternative form of complete charac-
terization, using a slightly dierent choice of nite representation for the possible
behaviours of the protocol, in terms of realizable patterns. We modify an exist-
ing protocol verication tool, called Scyther2 [2], to compute these alternative
complete characterizations.
Example 2 (Needham-Schroeder (Patterns, Scyther)). Consider again the two-
party version of the Needham-Schroeder protocol. From the point of view of a
responder Bob, upon the completion of the protocol, the following must have
1 At the moment of writing this, CPSA is not available for download.
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happened: there must be an honest agent that has performed the initiator role
of the protocol, and received Bob's nonce. If we take intruder actions into ac-
count, there are two distinct cases: either the intruder knows the secret key of the
partner of this agent, or this agent is talking to Bob. In this view, the complete
characterization of the responder role is captured by two distinct message ows:
First, the message ow in which the intruder knows the secret key of the initia-
tor's supposed partner, and the intruder performs decryption and encryption of
messages. Second, the message ow in which the protocol runs as expected.
Hence, in this more ne-grained approach we distinguish between the two
sub-cases of the rst example, and there is no need to infer agent equalities to
unfold the execution traces.
In this paper we discuss the relation between the two representations. In
short, the shapes approach provides a slightly more coarse, and therefore some-
times more concise representation than the pattern approach, but has a more
implicit relation with the actual behaviours of the protocol.
Furthermore, we provide extensive empirical results. We compare these re-
sults to the currently reported results of the CPSA tool, revealing three advan-
tages of the Scyther approach. First, the pattern renement algorithm allows for
a wider range of protocols to be characterized. Second, if complete character-
ization is not achieved for a protocol, the pattern output still provides insight
into the protocol behaviour. Third, Scyther is more ecient at computing the
characterizations.
Purpose of the paper In this paper, we aim at providing a high-level idea of the
concept of complete characterization, and our novel way of computing it. We
report on our current work-in-progress and provide preliminary experimental
results. We will omit technical details and explain by example where possible.
The full technical details will be explained in the full paper.
Outline of the paper We start o by giving a high-level sketch of the complete
characterization concept, and the shapes and skeletons theory, in Section 2. We
describe the alternative characterization in terms of patterns in Section 3. We
provide a preliminary empirical analysis in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.
2 Complete characterizations as shapes
The concept of complete characterization was introduced in [6]. The idea is
to consider a role of a particular role of a protocol, and give a concise nite
representation of all essentially dierent possible behaviours of the protocol that
include this particular role. Intuitively, the complete characterization provides a
concise answer to the question \which other events must also have occurred, if
we assume that this role was executed?"4 C.J.F. Cremers
Strand spaces In this paper we omit technical details. We therefore assume the
reader is at least to some extent familiar with the basic of the Strand Space
method as described in e.g. [8]. There is one property we recall here, which con-
cerns capturing the generation of fresh terms (nonces). The Strand Space method
does not distinguish between dierent terms (except for having an explicit key
set), but Nonce generation is captured by the concept of unique origination: a
term t can be said to uniquely originate from node n. This eectively connects
nonces to the rst send event in the role instance in which they occur as a sub-
term. A set of such bindings of terms to a specic event is called the unique
origination set, and is written as unique.
Skeletons and homomorphisms Until recently, the Strand Space model was used
only to model possible execution traces of security protocols in general: as there
are no notions of e.g. protocol or variable instantiation in the original Strand
Space model. Hence, in order to be able to specify a protocol, and its relation
to protocol execution, modications to the strand space model are introduced.
In the skeletons and homomorphisms approach, the strand space approach
is extended with a number of new notions.
First, in the original Strand Space method there is no way to indicate which
agents are honest, which in this method boils down to indicating which private
keys are not known to the intruder. In the skeletons and homomorphisms ap-
proach, there is an explicit set of private keys not known to the intruder, written
as non.
Second, the concept of variable instantiation is replaced by the notion of in-
formation preserving homomorphisms. In e.g. process calculus approaches, role
descriptions contain variables, which are instantiated in each of its possible exe-
cutions. In the Strand Space method no such variables occur. Instead, the proto-
col contains terms, which can be substituted by other (atomic) terms, as long as
the substitution is said to be information-preserving with respect to the unique
origination set unique, as well as the private key set non.
In the strand spaces terminology, a set of strands with a partial ordering
is referred to as a bundle. However, in the shapes setting, one only considers
regular strands (and thus only the behaviour of honest agents, and not that of
the intruder). As a result, a skeleton can correspond to the regular part of a
bundle, extended with the information in the associated nonand uniquesets: it
consists of a four tuple (nodes;;non;unique). In particular, a skeleton is said
to be realizable if it corresponds to an execution trace of the protocol when all
agents whose keys are not in unique are considered to be compromised. Finally,
shapes are minimal realizable skeletons.
Example 3. In Figure 1 we have that unique = fNbg and non = fprivk(A)g.
The gure is a realizable skeleton (execution trace if we assume C to be com-
promised), and also a shape.
Complete characterization In terms of the notions described above, the complete
characterization of a protocol role is the set of all shapes of this protocol. In otherComplete Characterization of Security Protocols by Pattern Renement 5
words, if the role is executed in a particular trace, then one of the shapes will also
occur in that trace. The complete characterization of a protocol is the complete
characterization of each of its roles.
In general, most protocols only have only very few shapes. We have seen
the responder role of the Needham-Shroeder protocol has only one shape. In
general, protocol roles of correct protocols (i.e. that satisfy strong authentication
properties) have usually only one shape. However, in theory protocols may also
have an innite amount of shapes.
If nite, the complete characterization allows for easy verication of a large
class of authentication properties, e.g. if every shape of the responder role con-
tains an initiator role, then existence of an initiator is guaranteed for all exe-
cutions of the responder role. If one shape does not have an initiator role, it
represents a class of counterexamples.
3 Complete characterization by pattern renement
In this section we describe an alternative approach to achieve a complete char-
acterization of a security protocols. This new approach uses patterns instead of
skeletons.
The skeletons, as described in the previous section, x the behaviour of the
honest agents, and do not describe the intruder behaviour explicitly. Rather,
a realizable skeleton implies that there exists intruder behaviour such that the
events can be executed as described.
Patterns A pattern is a partially ordered set of protocol events. These protocol
events may contain type variables, e.g.
send(A;R]0;V ]0)]0
where R]0 is of type Agent and V ]0 of type Message. This event represents any
send event by the agent A in thread 0. In general, the notation X]Y denotes
that the event or term X is local to the thready Y .
Realizable patterns A pattern is said to be realizable if for any substitution that
meets the variable typing constraints, and any linearization of the partial order,
the sequence of resulting events forms a valid execution trace of the protocol.
Given a pattern pt of a protocol P, the pattern renement algorithm in
Scyther [2] computes a set of realizable patterns such that the union of the
traces of the protocol with the realizable patterns, is equal to the traces of the
original pattern. For most patterns the set of realizable patterns that correspond
to the same set of traces, is nite.
Pattern subsumption The set of realizable patterns computed by pattern rene-
ment is not guaranteed to be minimal. In particular, it may be the case that the
set includes two patterns pt1;pt2, such that traces(P;pt1)  traces(P;pt2). In
such cases, pt1 is redundant.6 C.J.F. Cremers
We have implemented pattern subsumption tests in Scyther. These tests try to
determine for some patterns pt;pt0 of a protocol P whether or not traces(P;pt0) 
traces(P;pt). Using these tests, the result set of the renement algorithm is
minimized. This has only eect in a very limited number of cases, but has been
implemented to guarantee a form of minimality over the characterization.
Complete pattern characterization Using the pattern renement algorithm in
combination with the subsumption tests, it is straightforward to construct a
complete characterization algorithm.
1. Given a protocol and a role, a pattern is constructed, with an arbitrary
thread identier, e.g. 0, which is a direct translation of the description of
the role into trace events: roles are replaced by local role variables, e.g. R is
replaced by the variable R]0, and local constants and variables are similarly
bound to the thread, i.e. a constant ni is replaced by the constant ni]0, and
a variable X is replaced by the variable X]0. (Note that in terms of Scyther
internals, this corresponds to simply placing a \reachable" claim at the end
of the role.)
2. The resulting pattern is rened into the full set of realizable patterns, if
possible. (In terms of Scyther internals, this is captured by requesting all
attacks.)
3. Finally, the realizable pattern set is minimized by using the subsumption
tests.
Example 4. In Figure 2 we provide an example characterization of the respon-
der role of the Needham-Schroeder protocol. The result is two patterns, which
correspond to either the expected behaviour of the protocol on the left, or the
man-in-the-middle attack on the right. As a result, any trace of the protocol
that includes the events of the responder role, will necessarily also include the
events from one of the patterns in the complete characterization.
Comparing both characterization concepts At rst sight, upon considering the
Needham-Schroeder example, it seems that both concepts dier signicantly,
in the sense that the shape characterization is more coarse and therefore more
concise, than the pattern characterization.
The shape characterization is more coarse (and thus may be more concise) be-
cause the agents whose keys are not in the non set, may be instantiated by honest
or dishonest agents. In the cases where both these options can lead to traces of
the protocol, the pattern characterization will always distinguish between them.
As a result, we nd that the two Needham-Schroeder patterns for the responder
role are subsumed by one shape in the skeletons-and-homomorphisms approach.
We note that the more coarse denition in terms of shapes has a disadvan-
tage: the relation between the shape and its possible executions is slightly more
complicated. Consider e.g. the example in Figure 1. In the case that privk(C) is
not known to the intruder, and C 6= B, the shape does not represent a valid ex-
ecution. Hence, in some sense, the shape is an over-approximation of all possibleComplete Characterization of Security Protocols by Pattern Renement 7
[Id 2] Protocol ns3, role R, claim type Reachable
read_1 from I#2
{ ni#2,I#2 }pk(R#1)
send_2 to I#2
{ ni#2,nr#1 }pk(I#2)
Run #1
any agent R#1 in role R
I -> any agent I#2
R -> any agent R#1
Const nr#1
Var ni -> ni#2
read_3 from I#2
{ nr#1 }pk(R#1)
read_2 from R#1
{ ni#2,nr#1 }pk(I#2)
claim_R1
Reachable
send_1 to R#1
{ ni#2,I#2 }pk(R#1)
Run #2
any agent I#2 in role I
I -> any agent I#2
R -> any agent R#1
Const ni#2
Var nr -> nr#1
send_3 to R#1
{ nr#1 }pk(R#1)
Fig.2. Needham-Schroeder, role R complete characterization: exactly two pat-
terns
valid executions. In the case of patterns, any well-typed substitution of variables
is by denition a valid execution trace.8 C.J.F. Cremers
However, as the more abstract shapes can be more concise, an obvious next
question is whether we can abstract from patterns in the same way, to obtain
a coarser characterization, which could correspond more closely to the shapes
characterization. Hence we introduce the notion of shape approximation. In this
approximation, an agent communicating with a compromised agent (usually rep-
resented by Eve in Scyther) may also choose to communicate with any honest
agent. Internally, this involves two changes:
{ All occurrences of Eve are turned into a variable Anybody of type Agent
{ All patterns are projected onto their regular behaviour only, i.e. intruder
events are ltered out
After this, pattern subsumption is tested again, and certain patterns will be sub-
sumed by others: e.g. the normal behaviour of the Needham-Schroeder protocol
is now a subclass of the regular behaviour of the man-in-the-middle attack, in
which Anybody is mapped to Bob.
We discuss empirical results obtained from this approximation in Section 4.
4 Preliminary empirical results
We have applied the modied Scyther algorithm to the protocol models found
in the Scyther distribution. These include a large subset of the SPORE repos-
itory [9]. We have characterized each role of these protocols, by default named
as I (Initiator), R (Responder) and S (Server). The names of the protocols
correspond directly to the names of the protocols as chosen in the Scyther dis-
tribution.
The Scyther tool was run using its default settings (maxruns=5, typed vari-
ables).
In this default setup, not all roles could be completely characterized. Of the
115 roles characterized in this set, Scyther produced complete characterizations
for 75 roles. We summarize the results in Table 1 and 2.
In Table 1 we list the protocols for which Scyther was able to characterize all
roles. For each role, the number of patterns in the characterization is reported.
E.g. the two party Needham Schroeder protocol (ns3) has 2 patterns for its
responder role, representing the correct behaviour and the man-in-the-middle
attack. The Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol (nsl3) has only 1 pattern for the
responder, reecting that only the correct behaviour is possible.
In Table 2 we list the protocols for which the tool did not yield full character-
izations of each role. For roles for which the characterization was not complete,
we write  X to denote that Scyther nds X patterns, but cannot determine
whether these represent a complete characterization, or that more patterns are
needed.
Approximating Shape Characterization using patterns We have experimented
with an approximation of the Complete Shape Characterization of protocols. InComplete Characterization of Security Protocols by Pattern Renement 9
Table 1. Complete Pattern Characterizations (Scyther)
Protocol ID I R S
andrew 2 1 -
andrew-Ban 1 1 -
andrew-LoweBan 1 1 -
ccitt509-1 1 1 -
ccitt509-1c 1 1 -
ccitt509-ban3 1 1 -
ns3 1 2 -
nsl3 1 1 -
ksl-Lowe 1 1 1
neustub-GuttmanHwang 1 2 1
neustub-GuttmanHwang-Repeat 1 1 1
otwayrees 3 5 5
woolamPi-1 1 5 2
woolamPi-2 1 6 2
woolamPi-3 1 4 1
woolamPi-f 1 2 1
yahalom 1 1 1
yahalom-BAN 2 3 1
yahalom-Lowe 1 1 1
yahalom-Paulson 1 2 1
this approximation, an agent communicating with a compromised agent (repre-
sented by Eve) may also choose to communicate with any honest agent.
In our test set, this shape approximation did not cause many changes. We
summarize the changes in Table 3. Note that as we did not have access to the
exact protocol descriptions used in CPSA, the numbers in the last table may
not be comparable to the numbers produced by Scyther.
5 Preliminary conclusions and future work
We have sketched an alternative formulation of the complete characterization of
a protocol role in terms of realizable patterns. This approach can result in a larger
characterization set than the shapes-based approach by Doghmi, Guttman and
Thayer, but has the advantage of having a more direct relation to the execution
traces.
The protocol verication tool Scyther was extended to generate the complete
characterizations in patterns. Furthermore, we have implemented an alternative
type of patterns, intended to approximate the coarseness of the shapes approach.
Extensive empirical testing has already been performed with a large set of pro-
tocols. Our approach can deal with all reported CPSA examples, and also with
protocols that have been reported to be problematic for CPSA, such as Otway-
Rees, for which CPSA currently does not terminate.10 C.J.F. Cremers
Table 2. Incomplete Pattern Characterizations (Scyther)
Protocol ID I R S
andrew-Concrete  2  2 -
ccitt509-3 1  20 -
smartright 1  1 -
denningSacco  1  1 1
denningSacco-Lowe  2  2 1
kaochow 1  2 1
kaochow-2  1  2 1
kaochow-3  1  2 1
ksl  2  2 1
needhamschroederpk  20  20 1
needhamschroederpk-Lowe  20  20 1
needhamschroedersk  1  1 1
needhamschroedersk-amend  1  1  1
neustub-Hwang 2  2 1
spliceAS  18  20 1
spliceAS-CJ  18  19 1
spliceAS-HC  18  20 1
tmn  15 1 12
wmf 1  4  4
wmf-Lowe  4  4  4
woolam 3  3 3
woolamPi 1  7  3
Table 3. Scyther: from patterns to shape approximation
Protocol ID Role Patterns Shape approx.
ccitt509-3 R  20  5
ns3 R 2 1
needhamschroederpk I  20  10
needhamschroederpk R  20  10
needhamschroederpk-Lowe I  20  10
needhamschroederpk-Lowe R  20  10
spliceAS I  18  12
spliceAS R  20  16
spliceAS-CJ I  18  12
spliceAS-CJ R  19  9
spliceAS-HC I  18  12
spliceAS-HC R  20  16
tmn I  15  9
tmn S 12 1Complete Characterization of Security Protocols by Pattern Renement 11
As future work we will further analyze the empirical results, and optimize
the pattern subsumption testing, which is currently the most time-consuming
step in our method. Nevertheless, all characterizations performed here ran in
less than a few seconds. In particular, in the cases which were also handled by
CPSA, it seems Scyther is at least twice as fast.
Our preliminary results indicate that the pattern approach for complete char-
acterization is both useful and feasible. It is useful in the sense that the relation to
execution traces is straightforward, and feasible in the sense that many protocols
have nite pattern characterizations, and that Scyther can eciently compute
the complete characterizations in terms of patterns.
References
1. Blanchet, B.: An ecient cryptographic protocol verier based on Prolog rules.
In: Proc. 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW), IEEE
Computer Society (2001) 82{96
2. Cremers, C.: Scyther - Semantics and Verication of Security Protocols. Ph.D.
dissertation, Eindhoven University of Technology (2006)
3. Armando, A., Basin, D., Boichut, Y., Chevalier, Y., Compagna, L., Cuellar, J.,
Drielsma, P.H., He am, P.C., Kouchnarenko, O., Mantovani, J., M odersheim, S.,
von Oheimb, D., R., M., Santiago, J., Turuani, M., Vigan o, L., Vigneron, L.: The
AVISPA tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols and appli-
cations. In: Proc. of CAV'2005. LNCS 3576. Springer-Verlag (2005) 281{285
4. Cremers, C., Lafourcade, P.: Comparing state spaces in automatic security protocol
verication. In: Proc. 7th International Workshop on Automated Verication of
Critical Systems (AVoCS). Electron. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci., Elsevier Science
Publishers B. V. (2007)
5. Doghmi, S., Guttman, J., Thayer, F.: Searching for shapes in cryptographic proto-
cols. In: Proc. 13th Int. Conf. on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and
Analysis of Systems (TACAS). Volume 4424 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science.,
Springer-Verlag (2007) 523{537
6. Doghmi, S., Guttman, J., Thayer, F.: Skeletons and the shapes of bundles. http:
//www.ccs.neu.edu/home/guttman/skeletons.pdf (2006)
7. Doghmi, S., Guttman, J., Thayer, F.: Completeness of the authentication tests. In:
Proc. 12th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS).
(2007)
8. Thayer, F., Herzog, J., Guttman, J.: Strand spaces: Proving security protocols
correct. Journal of Computer Security 7 (1999) 191{230
9. Jacquemard, F.: Security Protocols Open Repository (SPORE) (2007) Available at
http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/index.html.